Online Appendix for "The Latin American Left's Mandate: Free-Market Policies and Issue Voting in New Democracies" *World Politics* **63(1)**

Dependent Variable: Assigning Party Ideology Scores

We generated ideology scores for nearly all vote-receiving parties and candidates in Latin America from 1995 to 2008 using a four-step algorithm. First, we assigned each party or presidential candidate their score on the 1↔20 Wiesehomeier-Benoit (W-B) scale, when available (Wiesehomeier and Benoit 2007a, 2007b).[1] The W-B scores are the mean placement by experts on a simple left-to-right scale. Using W-B scores, we were able to code 92% of the presidential vote and 81% of the legislative vote. Second, we used the ideology scores developed by Pop-Eleches (2009) to partially fill in remaining gaps (Lodola and Queirolo N.D.). Pop-Eleches updated through 2003 the five-point party ideology scores (left, center-left, center, center-right, right) developed by Coppedge (1998). We converted this five-point scale to its numerical W-B equivalent by assigning each category its observed mean in the W-B dataset. (The correlation between the Pop-Eleches and W-B scores is +.85 among parties available in both datasets). This second step enabled us to code another 5% of the presidential vote and 6% of the legislative vote. Third, we consulted Coppedge (1998) to help us code some of the missing small parties, again converting his scores to their W-B equivalency. After these three steps, we had coded 97% of the presidential vote and 87% of the legislative vote. Fourth and finally, for parties that did not appear in any of these three expert surveys, we conducted our own research and assigned them one of Coppedge's five labels, again converting them to W-B equivalencies. After completing this final step, we had coded 99.7% of the presidential vote and 93.8% of the legislative vote. Parties with no codes, which by this point were all miniscule, were

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[1] The original W-B scale runs from extreme left (1) to extreme right (20). We flipped the W-B scale so that higher scores on our dependent variable reflect greater leftism. For presidential elections, we assigned each candidate her or his party's score unless the candidate was the incumbent as of 2006, in which case we used the W-B ideology score of the president.

treated as missing in calculating VRL.

Existing measures of the left's electoral success use a binary approach that scores parties as part of the left or not. As we discuss in the main text, this approach leads to debatable coding decisions and ignores potentially important changes in vote allocations among center and rightist parties. Our approach gets around these problems by relying on fine-grained ideological distinctions between parties from across the left-right spectrum. Our approach also does a better job than Stokes's (2008) concept of the "relative left," which she defines as the party "that a voter would support if she wished to help elect a left-leaning party and to avoid 'wasting' her vote on a sure loser." This is not only a binary classification that excludes all but one "left" party, but since the relative left party is identified as one of the top two vote-getters (except when the first and second losers are nearly tied), it also may inadvertently classify a centrist or even a rightist party as the relative left. For instance, Stokes classifies the then-dominant and neoliberal PRI as the relative left in Mexico's 2000 presidential election, rather than the leftwing PRD. In contrast, our ideology measure scores the PAN on the right at Ideology=3.65, the PRI in the center at Ideology=9.45, and the PRD on the left at Ideology=16.45. It also scores the 10 other small parties that have competed in Mexico's presidential elections and 16 that have competed in Mexico's congressional elections since 1994.

Dependent Variable: The Effect of Using Static Ideology Scores

Our use of a fine-grained and updated ideology scale to measure parties' positions comes at a potential cost. The W-B scores were collected during recent electoral contests between 2003 and 2006, and thus are static rather than time-series data. As a result, we could have incorrectly estimated VRL. Since some observers believe that Latin America's leftist parties have moved toward the center over time, the primary concern would be the possibility that our measure overestimates the leftward shift in VRL_{pres}. Such an overestimate could only

result if parties that were to the left of center in the mid-1990s moved toward the center *and* won more votes by the late 2000s, or if parties to the right of center moved further to the right *and* won fewer votes by 2008. All other shifts would underestimate the change in VRL$_{pres}$. We employed two checks.

First, we consulted Pop-Eleches's (2008) dataset that sorts parties into ideological families by year. Only three parties (Argentina's Alianza, the Dominican Republic's PRD, and Brazil's PSDB) shifted from more to less leftist positions after 1995. We believe that other shifts involving large leftist parties did occur, but while Brazil's PT moved toward the center, Chávez's MVR in Venezuela and Kirchner's FpL in Argentina moved leftward.

Second, we consulted Alcántara's (2005) time-series data on legislator's economic policy preferences from 1995 to 2004. Among left-of-center parties, support for privatization fell, indicating that these parties may have moved further to left. Indeed, the peak of elite support for neoliberal economic policies in the region was in 1998, very early in our dataset (Baker 2009; Roberts 2008). Thus, we conclude that shifts to the center by previously left parties or rightward drift among conservative parties does not drive the quite modest observed change in VRL$_{pres}$ over time.

Independent Variables: Creating Public Opinion Indexes

Our public opinion variables, except where indicated, are indexes constructed from the variation shared by the aggregate results of two or more survey questions from the Latinbarometer series. (We used principal components analysis and extracted one component each time). The constituent survey items were not asked in every year, so the scores for any year in which at least one survey item was asked were calculated from the available items using Stata's "impute" command. We specify the percent of non-responses ("don't knows" and "not answered" to each question) in parentheses. The median and average non-response rates were just 10% and 12.5%, respectively.

<u>Mass support for the market</u> (Cronbach's alpha=.90 and the mean correlation is +.54). We selected seven items from a larger menu of survey questions on market issues, choosing only items that significantly loaded on the first principal component.

Elements of "Globalization" and "Globalization (Intensity)" Indexes in Figure 2:

A. "Would you say that your country benefits (4) a lot, (3) quite a bit, (2) a little or (1) not at all for being part of your regional trade agreement?" [1996 (26% non-responses), 1997 (13%), 1998/9 (12%), 2001 (18%), 2003 (34%)].

B. "Thinking about trade between your country and the United States, how important do you think it is for the economic development of your country? (4) Very important, (3) somewhat important, (2) not very important, (1) not important at all." [1997 (9%), 1998/9 (7%), 2003 (10%)].

C. "Foreign investment should be encouraged. Do you (4) strongly agree, (3) agree, (2) disagree, or (1) strongly disagree with this statement?" [1998/9 (8%), 2001 (8%)].

D. "In general, do you consider foreign investment to be (1) beneficial or (0) harmful for the development of the country?" [1995 (13%) and 1998/9 (9%)]. (Not part of "Globalization (Intensity)" Index.)

Globalization (Intensity)" tracks the proportion of respondents answering that (A) their country benefits "a lot" or "quite a bit" from their country's regional trade agreement, (B) trade with the United States is "very important" for their country's economic development, and (C) they "strongly agree" that foreign investment should be encouraged.

Elements of "Privatization" Index in Figure 2:

E. "The privatization of state-owned enterprises has been beneficial to the country. Do you (4) strongly agree, (3) agree, (2) disagree, or (1) strongly disagree with this statement?" [1998/9 (10%), 2000 (8%), 2001 (8%), 2002 (10%), 2003 (10%), 2005 (12%), 2007 (12%)].

F. "The state should leave productive activity to the private sector. Do you (4) strongly agree, (3) agree, (2) disagree, or (1) strongly disagree with this statement?" [1998/9 (9%), 2001 (8%),

2002 (11%)].

Sole item of "Market's Suitability" in Figure 2:

G. "The market economy is the most suitable system (*más conveniente*) for the country. Do you (4) strongly agree, (3) agree, (2) disagree, or (1) strongly disagree with this statement?" [1998/9 (14%), 2000 (15%), 2002 (10%), 2007 (21%)].

Mass Anti-Americanism (not an index because only a single item was available; mean of 2.10 and standard deviation of .31): "I'd like to know your opinion about the United States. Do you have a (1) very good, (2) good, (3) bad, or (4) very bad opinion of the United States?" (Prior to 2000, LB offered "normal" as an explicit response. To maintain consistency with the response set from subsequent years, we recoded "normal" to missing.)

Evaluations of economic welfare (Cronbach's alpha=.75 and the mean correlation is +.46).

A. "Do the salary or wages that you receive and your family income allow you to satisfactorily cover your necessities? In which of the following situations do you find yourself? (0) They don't cover necessities, we have great difficulties. (1) They don't cover necessities, we have difficulties. (2) They just cover necessities without great difficulties. (3) They cover necessities well, we can save."

B. "How worried are you about being without work or becoming unemployed during the next twelve months? (1) Not worried, (2) a little worried, (3) worried, (4) very worried."

C. "How would you evaluate the current general economic situation of the country? Would you say that it is (5) very good, (4) good, (3) normal, (2) bad, or (1) very bad?"

D. "How would you evaluate the current economic situation of you and your family? Would you say that it is (5) very good, (4) good, (3) normal, (2) bad, or (1) very bad?"

Pessimism about crime (Cronbach's alpha=.49 and the mean correlation is +.27):

A. "Have you, or someone in your family, been assaulted, been attacked, or been the victim of a crime in the last 12 months? (1) Yes, (0) No".

B. "From the list of things that I'm going to read, do you think each has (5) increased a lot, (4)

increase a little, (3) stayed the same, (2) decreased a little, or (1) decreased a lot in the last twelve months?" ["last 5 years used in 1995 and 1996"]

C. "Please tell me, for each one of these groups, institutions, or persons listed on this card, how much confidence do you have in each? The police. (1) A lot, (2) some, (3) a little, or (4) none?"

Mass support for democracy. (Correlation is +.67; mean of .00, standard deviation of .82, and range from -2.17 to 2.01)

A. "In general, would you say that you are (4) very satisfied, (3) fairly satisfied, (2) not very satisfied, or (1) not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in your country?"

B. "With which of the following statements do you agree most? (3) Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government. (1) Under some circumstances, an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one. (2) For people like me, it does not matter whether we have a democratic or a non-democratic regime."

Sampling Issues in the Latinbarometer Surveys

Some observers have criticized Latinbarometer's sampling techniques and in particular changes in the national representativeness of their samples over time. In its early years, Latinbarometer tended to exclude rural residents from its sampling frame, including them only in latter years. As a result, our estimates of the public opinion trends could be biased. For instance, rural residents may be less pro-market than urban ones, thus producing the appearance of a downward trend in support for the market over time simply because rural residents were excluded in early cross-sections and included in later ones. The actual gap, however, between rural and urban attitudes toward market policies is non-existent to very small, depending on the indicator and time. Moreover, the decline in support for market policies is confirmed in surveys that do not suffer from this sampling bias (Baker 2009), and our own analyses (not shown) of urban-only residents confirms the decline in support for market policies through time.

Individual-Level Results

Table A.1 reports the full results from our individual level analysis of vote choice. The dependent variable is the party ideology score of each respondent's vote choice (recorded from the answer to the following question: "If there were elections tomorrow, for which party would you vote?"). Responses of "don't know" and "wouldn't vote" are dropped from the analysis. The explanatory variables are the individual-level versions of the public opinion measures used in the aggregate analysis, although we parse the economic performance index into two variables that better capture retrospective perceptions. The models are OLS regressions with country dummy variables and robust standard errors clustered by country.

As discussed in the text, market beliefs are strongly correlated with vote choice at the individual level, but so are other variables that are not correlated with aggregate election results. Particularly important for our argument is that retrospective performance assessments are related in the expected direction to vote choice at the individual level. Do these findings diminish our central claim that market beliefs, and not performance evaluations, drive VRL_{pres}?

Recall our argument in the text about the utility of aggregate-level data for studying party fortunes across multiple countries and elections: Individual-level relationships between attitudes and vote choices can remain constant across two or more elections even when there are consequential mean shifts in attitudes that drive vote choices. The individual-level finding that economic pessimists under center-right governments were more likely than optimists to prefer left parties merely conveys the salience of an attitude at one point in time. It does not, in and of itself, reveal that an exogenous shift in economic pessimism led to higher levels of voting for the left (even as it is a necessary condition for this trend to hold). Indeed, the finding that performance evaluations matter at the individual but not the aggregate level implies that performance evaluations themselves have a high degree of endogeneity to political preferences. In other words, citizens view the economy with partisan lenses, assessing the economy

favorably if they like the incumbent and assessing the economy negatively if they identify with

an out-party (Zaller 1992).

Table A.1: Individual Level Determinants of Vote Choice Ideology

	1998		2001		2007
Policy Mandate Variables					
Mass support for the market	-.344*	-.325*	-.302*	-.304*	-.325*
	(.096)	(.096)	(.111)	(.106)	(.074)
Mass anti-Americanism	.353*	.350*	.667*	.661*	.634*
	(.118)	(.118)	(.187)	(.182)	(.157)
Performance Mandate Variables					
Evaluations of family's economic welfare (CR)	-.122		-.216*		
	(.094)		(.099)		
Evaluations of family's economic welfare × Incumbent's ideology	.014		.059*		
	(.033)		(.013)		
Evaluations of country's economic welfare (CR)		-.347*		-.380*	-.278*
		(.109)		(.122)	(.087)
Evaluations of country's economic welfare × Incumbent's ideology		.085*		.121*	.128*
		(.027)		(.016)	(.015)
Pessimism about crime (CR)	.557*	.470*	1.042*	.929*	.223*
	(.275)	(.257)	(.326)	(.306)	(.126)
Pessimism about crime × Incumbent's ideology	-.079	-.056	-.100*	-.072	-.076*
	(.084)	(.083)	(.057)	(.060)	(.020)
Mass support for democracy (CR)	-.553*	-.494*	-.419*	-.372*	-.251
	(.121)	(.116)	(.163)	(.153)	(.168)
Mass support for democracy × Incumbent's ideology	.106*	-.056	.119*	.099*	.091*
	(.057)	(.083)	(.036)	(.034)	(.024)
Demographics					
Wealth	.040	.100	.484	.391	-.718
	(.334)	(.322)	(.475)	(.448)	(.490)
Education	.038*	.037*	.006	.005	.024
	(.020)	(.020)	(.027)	(.026)	(.023)
Woman	-.267*	-.271*	-.267*	-.266*	-.241*
	(.130)	(.127)	(.099)	(.099)	(.126)
Age	-.008	-.008	-.009	-.010*	-.005
	(.006)	(.005)	(.005)	(.005)	(.004)
Incumbent's ideology	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
N	8,918	8,918	7,655	7,655	9,714

Note: Entries are OLS coefficients with robust standard errors (adjusted for clustering by country) in parentheses. Country fixed-effects are not shown and are the reason that *Incumbent ideology* coefficient is not estimable. Evaluations of family's economic welfare was not available for 2007.

Graphical Results by Country

Our finding that mass support for the market has led to a rise in VRL$_{pres}$ in Latin America highlights a regionwide trend, but there is surely cross-national heterogeneity in how closely each country has followed this trend. Indeed, it is possible that this result is driven by a few outlying or atypical cases. We briefly investigate this possibility graphically by plotting for each country the trends in Mass support for the market by VRL$_{pres}$. Table A.2 contains these results. Our expectation is that Mass support for the market (summarized with the black lines) trends

downward while VRL$_{pres}$ (summarized with the grey lines) trends upward. Divergences from this pattern reflect distinct national developments that, we suggest, should be the subject of subsequent research. An "eyeball" analysis of this type is surely open to different interpretations, but we argue that only Ecuador, Honduras, and Nicaragua diverge noticeably from this pattern. In these countries, VRL$_{pres}$ remained static even as enthusiasm for the market decreased. (It is interesting to note that all three of these countries did end up with leftist presidents). Argentina and Venezuela also diverge slightly because they reached higher levels of VRL$_{pres}$ levels in a wavier, non-monotonic pattern. Nevertheless, both of these countries fit our theoretical predictions when comparing the first and last observed elections.

Table A.2: Trends in Mass Support for the Market and VRL$_{pres}$ by Country

Note: Black line (left axis) is lowess-estimated Mass support for the market and grey line (right axis) is observed VRL$_{pres}$.